Gyazo data breach: what a screenshot tool keeps
Gyazo's breach took 23.6 million user records and the text read from users' images, some deleted years before. What a screenshot tool keeps, and how long.
Published · 4 min read

On 16 September Helpfeel, the Kyoto company behind the screenshot-sharing service Gyazo, disclosed that an attacker had taken about 23.6 million user records and about 490 million records describing users' images. Those image records included the text Gyazo had read out of the pictures. A later update added 174 million records of the same kind for images users had deleted, most of them by February 2023. Screenshot tools are the kind staff install for themselves, and what they keep is whatever was on the screen.
The attacker used a flaw in Gyazo's image upload server to run commands on 11 September. Helpfeel noticed that evening, blocked the routes by early the next morning and fixed the flaw on 12 September. The user records held hashed passwords and, in about 5.6 million of them, an email address; about 18 million belonged to anonymous accounts with none, and Helpfeel says no payment details were disclosed. Beside the text, each image record carried the uploader's IP address, any location data stored in the image, a title, a source URL and the image ID from which its web address is built. For a capture shared at the default setting, The Hacker News noted, the link is all that protects it. Helpfeel says it has not confirmed any loss of image data, but cannot rule out that some private images were viewed.
A copy nobody approved
Tools like this spread because they are useful. Staff install one to show a colleague an error, a record or a half-filled form, and it uploads the capture and returns a link. Nobody signs a contract for it and nobody adds it to the inventory, so nobody in the organisation knows that a second copy of those screens exists, outside the system's permissions, its audit trail and its retention rules. Where the tool reads the text out of each capture, as Gyazo did, the vendor also holds the words that were on the screen.
Deleted at the vendor is not the same as gone
The second update is the part I would show a board. The 174 million records belonged to images users had deleted, most of them at least three and a half years before the attack. Helpfeel says the deleted image files themselves were not included, but the records about them were still there to be taken. Pressing delete removes something from your view; what the vendor keeps behind it, and for how long, is the vendor's decision. The Data Privacy Act of 2012 says personal data should be kept only as long as its purpose needs, unless a legal claim, a legitimate business purpose or another law calls for longer (Section 11(e)), and a screenshot of a record, held by a supplier years after the record itself was corrected or removed, is the kind of copy that rule is about.
What a system can do about it
Every office system that holds personal data shows it on screen: a staff review, a customer's file, an application waiting for a decision. No system can stop someone capturing what is on the screen. What a system can do is make one unnecessary, with a link to the record that opens only for someone allowed to see it, so a person who needs to show a colleague something sends them to the record rather than a picture of it. If I were designing that screen, the question I would ask is what people will want to show someone else, and how they can do it without making a copy.
Five checks for the tools nobody approved
- Ask staff which screenshot, file-sharing and note-taking tools they have installed, and treat the answer as an inventory, not a disciplinary matter.
- Approve one tool with admin controls, where the organisation owns the accounts, decides who can see a capture and sets how long captures are kept.
- Ask each vendor what deletion means: when the file goes, and when everything recorded about it, such as extracted text, goes too. Get the answer in writing.
- Make captures private by default. A link anyone can open is protected only by being hard to guess.
- If staff used Gyazo, have them change that password and any other that was the same or similar, as Helpfeel advises.
If staff screenshot records because the system gives them no other way to share one, the gap is in the system, and the fit check is a short way to find out whether it is worth fixing.
Sources
- Helpfeel, Notice and Apology Regarding a Data Breach Resulting from Unauthorized Access to Gyazo, 16 September 2026
- Helpfeel, Notice and Apology Regarding a Data Breach Resulting from Unauthorized Access to Gyazo (Update 2), 25 September 2026
- The Hacker News, Gyazo Breach Exposes 23.62 Million User Records and 490 Million Image Metadata Records, 17 September 2026
- Help Net Security, Hackers exploit Gyazo server flaw to steal 23.6 million user records, 21 September 2026
- Lawphil, Republic Act No. 10173
Enrique Lacambra III builds internal business systems from Cainta, Rizal.
Tell me what is broken and I will tell you if it is worth building. A 20-minute call, no charge, and I will say so if you do not need me.
